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	Comments on: Are we spiritual machines?	</title>
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	<link>https://www.anotherthink.com/contents/essays_on_faith/20040714_are_we_spiritual_machines.html</link>
	<description>One Christian&#039;s view of postmodern life.</description>
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		<title>
		By: Charlie		</title>
		<link>https://www.anotherthink.com/contents/essays_on_faith/20040714_are_we_spiritual_machines.html#comment-449</link>

		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Charlie]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 23 Jul 2004 16:53:25 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://144.24.24.144/contents/uncategorized/20040714_are_we_spiritual_machines.html#comment-449</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[&lt;p&gt;You&#039;re right. You&#039;d still be here. You can know subjectively that you are the real Jeremy.  Others can only know you objectively, and they may have trouble knowing which is the real you.  And the copy?  If it is a perfect brain copy, it will forcefully, subjectively believe and insist that it is you.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Doesn&#039;t matter.  You know the truth.  You&#039;re you.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;But what does that mean?  This is where Kurzweil develops his thinking in the area of patterns, and why he calls himself a patternist (a concept I didn&#039;t take the time to explain.)&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;Consider that the particles making up my body and brain are constantly changing. We are not at all permanent collections of particles. The cells in our bodies turn over at different rates, but the particles (e.g., atoms and molecules) that comprise our cells are exchanged at a very rapid rate.  I am just not the same collection of particles that I was even a month ago. It is the patterns of matter and energy that are semipermanent (that is, changing only gradually), but our actual material content is changing constantly.&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;He draws the analogy of a stream of water that is flowing past a large boulder.  It has a pattern of flow, an appearance of turmoil, eddies, etc. that seem not to change.  But what we observe is a pattern&#151;the actual matter making up that pattern changes every millisecond.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;So it could be said that &quot;I&quot; am more of a blueprint than a constant material being.  In fact, the heart of the aging process is that the cell-by-cell, atom-by-atom replacement that is going on constantly in my life gradually creates enough errors that things start to go awry.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Kurzweil suggests a thought experiment.  Suppose you developed a problem with a small group of neurons in your brain, and it was possible to replace them with a small chip that perfectly replicated the functions of those neurons.  You have the surgery.  You recover. You feel and think and seem the same as before. But now, part of your biological mechanism has been replaced with a functionally identical part (patterned after the biological).  Suppose you repeat the procedure, and gradually more and more of your brain is replaced with electronic equivalents.  At each stage, both you and your friends are convinced that you are still the same old you.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;...the gradual replacement scenario is not altogether different from what happens normally to our biological selves... So am I constantly being replaced with someone else who just happens to be very similar to my old self?&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;But consider this. The gradual replacement of my brain with a nonbiological equivalent is essentially identical to the following sequence: (i)scan Ray and reinstantiate Ray&#039;s mind file into new (nonbiological) Ray, and then (ii) terminate old Ray.&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Peter Singer says some very similar things when he lectures about his utilitarian philosophy, which finds that in a materialist world, such policies as elective infanticide, suicide and euthanasia can be morally justified because there is no intrinsic value to a life that is not wanted, or enjoyed, or one that does not meet certain objective standards of quality.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If we are merely patterns of cells and particles which happen to be arranged to hold certain subjective ideas (I am significant, I am unique, I am special, I deserve to live), but which from an objective viewpoint have no more value than any other collection of cells, which view of my own humanity rules: the collective view of society about me, or my view about me?&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;What does it mean to be me if I am more of a pattern than a permanent organism?&lt;/p&gt;
]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>You&#8217;re right. You&#8217;d still be here. You can know subjectively that you are the real Jeremy.  Others can only know you objectively, and they may have trouble knowing which is the real you.  And the copy?  If it is a perfect brain copy, it will forcefully, subjectively believe and insist that it is you.</p>
<p>Doesn&#8217;t matter.  You know the truth.  You&#8217;re you.</p>
<p>But what does that mean?  This is where Kurzweil develops his thinking in the area of patterns, and why he calls himself a patternist (a concept I didn&#8217;t take the time to explain.)</p>
<p><em>Consider that the particles making up my body and brain are constantly changing. We are not at all permanent collections of particles. The cells in our bodies turn over at different rates, but the particles (e.g., atoms and molecules) that comprise our cells are exchanged at a very rapid rate.  I am just not the same collection of particles that I was even a month ago. It is the patterns of matter and energy that are semipermanent (that is, changing only gradually), but our actual material content is changing constantly.</em></p>
<p>He draws the analogy of a stream of water that is flowing past a large boulder.  It has a pattern of flow, an appearance of turmoil, eddies, etc. that seem not to change.  But what we observe is a pattern&#151;the actual matter making up that pattern changes every millisecond.</p>
<p>So it could be said that &#8220;I&#8221; am more of a blueprint than a constant material being.  In fact, the heart of the aging process is that the cell-by-cell, atom-by-atom replacement that is going on constantly in my life gradually creates enough errors that things start to go awry.</p>
<p>Kurzweil suggests a thought experiment.  Suppose you developed a problem with a small group of neurons in your brain, and it was possible to replace them with a small chip that perfectly replicated the functions of those neurons.  You have the surgery.  You recover. You feel and think and seem the same as before. But now, part of your biological mechanism has been replaced with a functionally identical part (patterned after the biological).  Suppose you repeat the procedure, and gradually more and more of your brain is replaced with electronic equivalents.  At each stage, both you and your friends are convinced that you are still the same old you.</p>
<p><em>&#8230;the gradual replacement scenario is not altogether different from what happens normally to our biological selves&#8230; So am I constantly being replaced with someone else who just happens to be very similar to my old self?</em></p>
<p><em>But consider this. The gradual replacement of my brain with a nonbiological equivalent is essentially identical to the following sequence: (i)scan Ray and reinstantiate Ray&#8217;s mind file into new (nonbiological) Ray, and then (ii) terminate old Ray.</em></p>
<p>Peter Singer says some very similar things when he lectures about his utilitarian philosophy, which finds that in a materialist world, such policies as elective infanticide, suicide and euthanasia can be morally justified because there is no intrinsic value to a life that is not wanted, or enjoyed, or one that does not meet certain objective standards of quality.</p>
<p>If we are merely patterns of cells and particles which happen to be arranged to hold certain subjective ideas (I am significant, I am unique, I am special, I deserve to live), but which from an objective viewpoint have no more value than any other collection of cells, which view of my own humanity rules: the collective view of society about me, or my view about me?</p>
<p>What does it mean to be me if I am more of a pattern than a permanent organism?</p>
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			</item>
		<item>
		<title>
		By: Jeremy Pierce		</title>
		<link>https://www.anotherthink.com/contents/essays_on_faith/20040714_are_we_spiritual_machines.html#comment-448</link>

		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Jeremy Pierce]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 23 Jul 2004 13:06:59 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://144.24.24.144/contents/uncategorized/20040714_are_we_spiritual_machines.html#comment-448</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[&lt;p&gt;My problem is that I&#039;m still here. Are you suggesting that I&#039;d be in two places at once? How can making a copy of me mean it&#039;s me? Even if you took every detail of my body and made a duplicate, it wouldn&#039;t be me. It would be a duplicate. The same is true of my mind. The fact that my body and mind can continue on even if you do this is what shows this. So I just don&#039;t see why it would be me surviving immortally. It would be a copy of me. It may even be the kind of thing were everyone would think it&#039;s me, but I maintain that they&#039;d be wrong. This is my biggest criticism of the view most of the characters took in &lt;i&gt;The Sixth Day&lt;/i&gt;. At the end we saw a clear example of why it can&#039;t be right, both the dying original and the copy existing at the same time, each thinking he had every right to say he was the original.&lt;/p&gt;
]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>My problem is that I&#8217;m still here. Are you suggesting that I&#8217;d be in two places at once? How can making a copy of me mean it&#8217;s me? Even if you took every detail of my body and made a duplicate, it wouldn&#8217;t be me. It would be a duplicate. The same is true of my mind. The fact that my body and mind can continue on even if you do this is what shows this. So I just don&#8217;t see why it would be me surviving immortally. It would be a copy of me. It may even be the kind of thing were everyone would think it&#8217;s me, but I maintain that they&#8217;d be wrong. This is my biggest criticism of the view most of the characters took in <i>The Sixth Day</i>. At the end we saw a clear example of why it can&#8217;t be right, both the dying original and the copy existing at the same time, each thinking he had every right to say he was the original.</p>
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			</item>
		<item>
		<title>
		By: Charlie		</title>
		<link>https://www.anotherthink.com/contents/essays_on_faith/20040714_are_we_spiritual_machines.html#comment-447</link>

		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Charlie]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 23 Jul 2004 05:12:50 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://144.24.24.144/contents/uncategorized/20040714_are_we_spiritual_machines.html#comment-447</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[&lt;p&gt;It&#039;s an interesting puzzle.  In what respect would a computer that exactly modeled your mind, had all of your knowledge and memories, exhibited all of your idiosyncracies, and thought of itself as &quot;you&quot; not really be you?  Kurzweil and others would say that the essential us is what is in our mind, and if your body dies and a perfect clone of your mind lives on, in fact, it is you that continues to live.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;I think the materialists error is that our identity is not held within us, but is given to us by an external agent, God our Creator.&lt;/p&gt;
]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>It&#8217;s an interesting puzzle.  In what respect would a computer that exactly modeled your mind, had all of your knowledge and memories, exhibited all of your idiosyncracies, and thought of itself as &#8220;you&#8221; not really be you?  Kurzweil and others would say that the essential us is what is in our mind, and if your body dies and a perfect clone of your mind lives on, in fact, it is you that continues to live.</p>
<p>I think the materialists error is that our identity is not held within us, but is given to us by an external agent, God our Creator.</p>
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			</item>
		<item>
		<title>
		By: Jeremy Pierce		</title>
		<link>https://www.anotherthink.com/contents/essays_on_faith/20040714_are_we_spiritual_machines.html#comment-446</link>

		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Jeremy Pierce]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 22 Jul 2004 19:01:44 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://144.24.24.144/contents/uncategorized/20040714_are_we_spiritual_machines.html#comment-446</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[&lt;p&gt;Even if materialism is true, it doesn&#039;t follow that making a computer program modeled after your thought processes means you can be immortal. After all, you can do that and still continue where you are in your own brain and body. No one would think the computer program is you then. Why would it be you even if you happen to die right as the program goes online?&lt;/p&gt;
]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Even if materialism is true, it doesn&#8217;t follow that making a computer program modeled after your thought processes means you can be immortal. After all, you can do that and still continue where you are in your own brain and body. No one would think the computer program is you then. Why would it be you even if you happen to die right as the program goes online?</p>
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